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 Managerial Discretion in Accruals and Informational Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the relation between managerial discretion in accruals and 
informational efficiency. We measure managerial discretion in accruals by the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals. Assuming that efficient prices follow a random walk, we measure 
informational efficiency by using stock return variance ratios. We find that the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals is negatively associated with the price deviation from a random walk pattern, 
estimated in the 12-month period subsequent to the accrual reporting; hence, future informational 
efficiency increases with the extent to which managers exercise discretion over accruals. The 
results are consistent with the view that discretionary accruals, on average, convey useful 
information to investors and facilitate the price convergence to its fundamental value. Our 
findings are robust to a battery of tests, including tests to validate both our measures of 
informational efficiency and our measure of managerial discretion in accruals.  
 
Keywords: managerial discretion; discretionary accruals; informational efficiency; stock return 
variance ratios  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Informational efficiency is a fundamental aspect of market quality. The extent to which 
prices reflect available information has been shown to affect both capital allocation and real 
investment decisions (Wurgler 2000; Subrahmanyam and Titman 2001; Chen et al. 2006). The 
accounting process, as a major source of firm-specific information, is likely to play a crucial role 
in the determination of informational efficiency. On a related note, more research on how 
accounting affects informational efficiency has been called for by Kothari (2001) in his survey on 
accounting-based capital market research; by Lee (2001) in his commentary;1 and by Richardson 
et al. (2010) in their review of the literature on accounting anomalies. 
In this paper, we examine the relation between a central feature of the accounting process, 
namely managerial discretion in accruals, and informational efficiency. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) give managers considerable discretion in determining accruals 
through accounting policy choices and implementation decisions. This flexibility should enable 
them to convey relevant private information and improve earnings as a measure of firm 
performance (Guay et al. 1996; Francis et al. 2005). More informative financial statements (i.e., 
giving more precise information about of the financial position and performance of a firm) allow 
investors to improve their cash flow forecasts and help them to better process new information 
coming to the market by providing context for subsequent events and disclosures (Drake et al. 
2015, 2016). Therefore, ideally, managers’ discretionary choices in accrual reporting enhance 
                                                     
1  “Rather than remaining agnostic about the role of market prices, I advocate a more proactive approach. Rather than assuming 
market efficiency, we should study how, when, and why price becomes efficient (and why at other times it fails to do so). Rather than 
ignoring the current market price, we should seek to improve it.” (Lee 2001, p. 251). 
2 
investors’ ability to assess a firm’s fundamental value and, consequently, increase informational 
efficiency.2 However, managers can use the flexibility in accrual-based accounting not only as a 
tool to convey private information, but also to conceal the firm’s true underlying economic 
performance (Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Guay et al. 1996; 
Healy and Wahlen 1999). Because managers’ accrual choices are influenced by manifold 
unobservable financial reporting motivations, understanding what is the prevailing effect of their 
use of discretion over accruals on informational efficiency is an empirical question. 
In contrast to many prior works that focus on idiosyncratic samples where managers have 
specific incentives to exercise discretion over accruals, we focus on a general sample of firms. This 
allows us to examine the prevailing effect of managerial discretion exercised over accruals on 
informational efficiency in the whole population of firms. If the prevailing effect of managerial 
discretion in accruals on the informativeness of financial statements is beneficial (detrimental), 
we expect to observe a positive (negative) association between the extent to which managers use 
their discretion to manage earnings and the informational efficiency of a firm’s stock price in the 
period after the earnings release. 
We measure the extent to which managers exercise discretion over accruals by the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals;3 the main analysis uses the specification proposed by 
Kothari et al. (2005) to identify the discretionary portion of a firm’s total accruals. Our tests of 
informational efficiency are based on the assumption that informationally efficient prices follow 
                                                     
2  By fundamental value we refer to the present value of all expected future payoffs, discounted by the appropriate risk factor 
(Christensen and Feltham 2003; Penman 2013). A widely accepted definition of informational efficiency states that at any time 
informationally efficient prices fully reflect all available information (Fama 1970). Therefore, informationally efficient prices equal, at 
any time, an unbiased estimate of the fundamental value (e.g., Jensen 2005).  
3   We use the term ‘abnormal accruals’ to refer to the empirical proxy used to estimate the discretionary portion of accruals.   
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a random walk.4 Specifically, following a standard approach in the informational efficiency 
literature (e.g., Campbell et al. 1997), we focus on firm-specific stock return variance ratios to 
investigate the deviation of prices from the random walk benchmark.  
Using a large sample of U.S. firms over 20 years, we find that, after controlling for other 
cross-sectional determinants of informational efficiency (i.e., firm size, liquidity, trading volume, 
and institutional ownership), the deviation of the price pattern from a random walk process 
decreases as the absolute value of abnormal accruals increases; thus, informational efficiency in 
the period after the publication of the financial statements increases with the extent to which 
managers exercise discretion over accruals. In particular, a one standard deviation change in the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals is associated with approximately a 3% change in the 
measures of informational efficiency. 
We run a battery of tests to validate both our measures of informational efficiency and our 
measure of managerial discretion in accruals. Specifically, we show that our results are not driven 
by sub-samples where potentially extremely slow incorporation of information into stock prices 
may lead to a reversed interpretation of the informational efficiency measures (see Griffin et al. 
2010); furthermore, we show that the results are not attributable to cross-sectional differences in 
operating volatility or business model shocks, which can impair the ability of accrual expectation 
models to estimate the magnitude of managerial discretion in accruals (Hribar and Nichols 2007; 
Owens et al. 2016). 
                                                     
4  We note that our objective is not to test whether prices follow a random walk; we instead seek to explain cross-sectional differences 
in the extent to which prices deviate from an informationally efficient benchmark. Therefore, similar to prior literature (Boehmer and 
Kelley 2009), we take a ‘relative informational efficiency’ approach.  
4 
The results are robust to using alternative specifications that introduce additional control 
variables potentially related to informational efficiency (e.g., analyst coverage, growth 
opportunities, financial distress). Inference is also unchanged for alternative accrual expectation 
models, across different time periods, and sub-samples of profit vs. loss firms. The positive 
association between managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency persists over 
each quarter of the examined 12-month period. In the main analysis, we concentrate on annual 
discretionary accruals; we obtain similar results examining quarterly discretionary accruals. 
Controlling for the non-discretionary portion of accruals and for the perceived reliability of 
financial statements does not change the results.  
We also examine the cross-sectional variation in our results. We find that the richness of 
the information environment has a mitigating effect on the strength of the association between 
managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency; this result is consistent with 
managers’ reduced need of using accruals to convey information in richer information 
environments (Arya et al. 2003; Louis and Robinson 2005). Furthermore, we identify a sub-sample 
of restated financial statements in which the primary reason for restatement is related to accrual 
accounting; in this setting, a larger use of discretion in accrual reporting presumably makes 
accounting numbers less informative for market participants. Accordingly, we find a negative 
association between the absolute value of abnormal accruals and informational efficiency in this 
sub-sample. Our cross-sectional evidence further supports the view that our main results are due 
to the effect of managerial discretion in accruals on the informativeness of financial statements. 
Our main empirical results indicate that, on average, discretionary accruals convey useful 
information to market participants, which facilitates the convergence of prices to the fundamental 
5 
value in the period after the publication of the financial statements. The observed positive 
association between the extent to which managers’ exercise discretion over accruals and 
informational efficiency is an aggregate result and supports the interpretation that the prevailing 
effect of managerial discretion in accruals on the informativeness of financial statements is 
beneficial. These findings are in contrast with the general view underlying a large body of 
empirical literature that considers a higher magnitude of discretionary accruals as indicating 
poorer earnings quality,5 and a related stream of literature that documents that the prevailing 
effect of discretion in accruals on the informativeness of financial statements is detrimental. For 
example, some of these works find that the magnitude of abnormal accruals, and proxies of (poor) 
accounting quality which have been documented to be positively correlated to the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals, are positively associated to various aspects of mispricing (e.g., Francis et al. 
2007; Callen et al. 2013; Perotti and Wagenhofer 2014). In additional analyses, we examine how 
our results are related to these works. However, our findings contribute to and are consistent 
with a stream of empirical works that find that discretionary accruals have significant predictive 
power with respect to future earnings and cash flows (e.g., Subramanyam 1996; Bowen et al. 2008; 
Badertscher et al. 2012) and with many normative and analytical works that suggest that 
managerial discretion in earnings is predominately informative (e.g., Sankar and Subramanyam 
2001; Arya et al. 2003; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2012). 
In addition to the literature on the informativeness of managerial discretion in accruals, 
we also contribute to the literature on informational efficiency and price formation by 
documenting a positive association between managerial discretion in accruals and informational 
                                                     
5  See Francis et al. (2006), Dechow et al. (2010), and Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012) for a recent overview of earnings quality research. 
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efficiency. Although informational efficiency is of paramount importance to regulators and 
market participants, the consequences of managerial discretion in accounting numbers for the 
informational efficiency of stock prices have received little attention in prior research. In this 
respect, our results also inform about potential adverse effects of reducing accrual-based 
discretion on informational efficiency.6  
This work also has important practical relevance within the current trend in accounting 
regulation. Some of the major issues addressed by the standard setters in recent years involve 
accrual-based managerial discretion. For instance, FASB’s notable revisions concern the 
accounting standards on financial instruments, employee stock options, fixed assets and goodwill 
impairment, and valuation of acquired intangibles (Lev et al. 2010). Current joint projects of the 
FASB and IASB deal with revenue recognition, financial instruments, and leases. Particularly 
with the proposed convergence to the more principles-based International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), the need for managers to apply their professional judgment over accounting 
numbers is expected to increase (Alexander and Jermakovicz 2006).7 These regulatory changes 
are likely to substantially influence the extent of discretion in accrual reporting. 
2. MOTIVATION AND RELATED LITERATURE 
The accounting literature has mainly examined two different motivations for managers to 
make use of the flexibility allowed by GAAP in accrual reporting. One possibility is that 
                                                     
6  Particularly in the wake of the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, policy makers increasingly advocated a reduction of 
accounting discretion. As emphasized by Fields et al. (2001, p. 259), it is important for regulators to “understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of allowing choice and determine the ‘optimal’ level of discretion”. See Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Bushman and 
Landsman (2010) for critical surveys.  
7  See, for example, the special issues, Accounting Horizons (March 2003) and Abacus (June 2006), dedicated to the principles-based vs. 
rules-based accounting standards debate. 
7 
discretionary accruals are used by managers as a means to communicate private information 
about future economic prospects to investors (‘signaling view‘). The second possibility is that 
discretionary accrual reporting is mostly contracting-motivated. Contracting motivations can be 
opportunistic (‘opportunistic-contracting view‘); for example, it has been documented that 
managers manipulate earnings to maximize bonus payouts (Healy 1985) or to avoid violations of 
debt contracts (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Alternatively, it has also been suggested that 
contracting-motivated choices are aimed at improving the efficiency of contracts (‘efficient-
contracting view‘); these choices can have the objective of reducing agency costs among 
stakeholders (Watts 1977; Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986; Demski et al. 1984). 
According to the signaling view, discretionary accruals provide useful information to 
investors. A large group of normative and analytical works supports the signaling view (e.g., 
Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Demski 1998; Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; Arya et al. 2003; 
Stocken and Verrecchia 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2012), though relatively limited research 
examines this perspective from the empirical side (e.g., Subramanyam 1996; Louis and Robinson 
2005; Bowen et al. 2008; Gunny and Zhang 2014). Subramanyam (1996) empirically finds that 
discretionary accruals are positively associated with contemporaneous stock returns; he explains 
this result by the ability of discretionary accruals to predict future profitability. Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) find that firms that use abnormal accruals to smooth their earnings increase the 
informativeness of their current stock price with respect to future earnings; they interpret this as 
managers’ using accruals to convey private information about future earnings. Bowen et al. (2008) 
document that increased accounting discretion due to poor corporate governance quality is 
positively associated with future cash flows and return on assets. Badertscher et al. (2012) 
8 
examine a sample of restatement firms and find that, if the restatements are not opportunistically 
motivated, the originally reported earnings and accruals have a higher forecasting power than 
the restated numbers. It is worthwhile noticing that we differ from the aforementioned studies 
that focus on future profitability as we concentrate on future informational efficiency; the 
difference is substantial, as the latter is determined by changes in investors’ expectations 
conditional on accrual reporting throughout the period after the earnings release, while the 
former represents an ex post accounting realization.  
The opportunistic-contracting view predicts that discretionary accruals do not convey 
useful information, unless investors are able to recognize the opportunistic motivation of the 
reporting choices (Dechow et al. 2010). In accordance with this view, an extensive body of 
literature uses discretionary accruals as a proxy for poor earnings quality.8 For example, some 
recent studies provide evidence consistent with the notion that accrual-based managerial 
discretion adversely affects the informativeness of financial statements by investigating different 
aspects of mispricing. Francis et al. (2007) find that a disproportionate amount of post-earnings-
announcement drift (PEAD) returns is associated with stocks characterized by high information 
uncertainty. As one of their measures of information uncertainty, they use the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals. Their results imply that managerial discretion in accruals reduces the ability 
of market participants to interpret accounting information around earnings announcements. 
Callen et al. (2013) document that price delay, defined as the delay with which market 
information is incorporated into prices (following Hou and Moskowitz 2005), decreases with 
accruals quality. Because accruals quality is partly driven by managers’ discretionary choices, 
                                                     
8  See, for example, Francis et al. (2006), Dechow et al. (2010), or a review of the audit literature by DeFond and Zhang (2014). 
9 
these results may imply that discretionary accruals reduce the ability of market participants to 
interpret market-wide information. Perotti and Wagenhofer (2014) document that the absolute 
value of abnormal accruals is positively associated with the absolute value of excess returns in 
the following year, which is used as a measure of mispricing. Their findings are in line with the 
view that discretionary accruals reduce the ability of market participants to estimate equity value 
correctly. 
As introduced above, the different motivations underlying the use of discretion in accrual 
accounting have conflicting implications for the informativeness of financial statements (i.e., the 
precision with which they represent the performance and the financial position of the firm).9 
Overall, as suggested, for example, by Dye and Verrecchia (1995) and Hann et al. (2007), 
understanding what is the prevailing effect of managerial discretion on the informativeness of 
financial statements is an empirical issue. More informative financial statements help investors 
to improve their cash flow forecasts and, by providing context for subsequent events and 
disclosures, to better process new information (Drake et al. 2015, 2016). Therefore, if managerial 
discretion in accruals affects the informativeness of financial statements, we expect that 
informational efficiency varies with the extent to which managers make use of their discretion in 
accruals. Given the absence of consensus in the literature regarding the informative role of 
managerial discretion in accruals, we formulate two alternative directional hypotheses. If the 
prevailing effect of managerial discretion in accruals on the informativeness of financial 
                                                     
9  The efficient-contracting view does not provide a clear-cut prediction as to the effect of managerial discretion on the informativeness 
of financial statements. See Badertscher et al. (2012) for a discussion of the efficient-contracting view implications for accrual 
informativeness. 
10 
statements is beneficial, we expect that managerial discretion in accruals and informational 
efficiency are positively associated. 
H1a. Managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency are positively associated. 
Conversely, if the prevailing effect of managerial discretion in accruals on the 
informativeness of financial statements is detrimental, we expect that managerial discretion in 
accruals and informational efficiency are negatively associated. 
H1b. Managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency are negatively associated. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
Measuring the extent of discretion in accruals  
To measure discretionary accruals, we use a performance-adjusted version of the 
modified Jones model, as proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). The model is meant to capture 
management’s discretionary reporting decisions in accruals by splitting a firm’s total accruals 
into normal and abnormal accruals, where the normal portion of accruals is assumed to be 
economically driven by the firm’s underlying business activities. 
Using the Fama-French 48 industries classification,10 our proxy for discretionary accruals 
is the prediction error (abnormal accruals) obtained from the following regression model 
estimated by industry-year (firm subscript i is suppressed for notational convenience): 
TAt = β0 + β1(1/ATt−1) + β2(∆SALESt − ∆ARt) + β3PPEt + β4ROAt−1 + εt (1) 
                                                     
10  Using two-digit SIC code instead of the Fama-French 48 industries classification does not affect our results. 
11 
where TA is total accruals,11 calculated as: change in current assets (Compustat ACT) minus 
change in cash and short-term investments (Compustat CHE) minus change in current liabilities 
(Compustat LCT) plus change in debt included in current liabilities (Compustat DLC) minus 
depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat DP); ∆SALES is change in sales (Compustat 
SALE); ∆AR is change in accounts receivables (Compustat RECT); PPE is gross property, plant 
and equipment (Compustat PPEGT); ROA is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat 
IB) divided by total assets (Compustat AT). 
All variables (except lagged ROA) are deflated by beginning-of-year total assets to 
mitigate heteroscedasticity. As we do not impose any directional sign on management’s accrual 
decisions, we use the absolute value of the prediction error as our firm-year specific measure of 
the extent to which managers exercise discretion over accruals (ABSDA). 
Measuring informational efficiency 
Price deviation from a random walk as a measure of informational efficiency 
We measure informational efficiency by the price deviation from a random walk pattern; 
assuming that informationally efficient prices follow a random walk, a higher deviation from the 
random walk pattern implies a wider divergence from an unbiased estimate of the fundamental 
value and, thus, lower informational efficiency.12 
The logic of the random walk idea as a benchmark for informationally efficient prices is 
summarized, for example, by Malkiel (2003): “If the flow of information is unimpeded and 
                                                     
11  Alternatively, we calculated total accruals using the cash flow approach as proposed by Hribar and Collins (2002), and our inference 
is unchanged. The results are discussed in Section 7. 
12  It is also worthwhile to notice that this approach to measuring informational efficiency is consistent with the assumption that the 
fundamental value follows a random walk. 
12 
information is immediately reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow’s price change will reflect 
only tomorrow’s news and will be independent of the price changes today. But news is by 
definition unpredictable, and thus, resulting price changes must be unpredictable and random.”  
Prices deviate from the random walk pattern due to the process of price adjustment to 
new information in the convergence to an unbiased estimate of the fundamental value.13 
Alternative explanations include illiquidity and time-varying expected returns; as described in 
the following sub-section, these two explanations are unlikely to play a significant role in 
determining our results. 
The deviation of the price from the random walk pattern is a widely used measure of 
informational efficiency. Early contributions on testing the deviation from random walk pricing 
are provided by Fama (1965), Barnea (1974), and Solnik (1974). More recently, these tests have 
been used as measures of informational efficiency in different research fields: for example, 
Boehmer and Kelley (2009) (the role of institutional investors), Griffin et al. (2010) (international 
comparison of market efficiency), Choi et al. (2009) (in the bond market), Erdos and Ormos (2010) 
(in the art market), Bennett and Wei (2006) and O’Hara and Ye (2011) (the effect of market 
fragmentation), Boehmer et al. (2015) (in the derivatives market), Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) (the 
effect of short selling constraints), Conrad et al. (2015) (the effect of high frequency trading), 
Kadapakkam et al. 2015 (informational efficiency of exchange traded funds). Surveys of the 
empirical literature on informational efficiency are contained in Charles and Darné (2009) and 
                                                     
13  A number of prior works suggest that the process of price adjustment to new information leads to non-zero return autocorrelation 
and, therefore, to a deviation from the random walk benchmark. See, e.g., Klibanoff et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998, 2001), Chordia 
and Swaminathan (2000), Hong et al. (2000), Adams et al. (2004), Anderson (2011), Anderson et al. (2012, 2013). 
13 
Lim and Brooks (2011); a methodological discussion of the informational efficiency measures is 
provided by Campbell et al. (1997). 
The measures of informational efficiency  
Our main measure of informational efficiency is the return variance ratio. Variance ratios 
reflect the deviation of the price pattern from a random walk process. The analysis is based on 
daily returns, as obtained from CRSP. We compute the variance ratio, VR(n,m), as n/m times the 
ratio of the m-day return variance to the n-day return variance.14 We use continuously 
compounded returns. A random walk implies that the ratio of long-term to short-term variances, 
per unit of time, is equal to one.15 Variance ratios less than one are consistent with negative return 
autocorrelation; variance ratios greater than one are consistent with positive return 
autocorrelation; if return autocorrelations at all lags are equal to zero, variance ratios are equal to 
one. Because we are interested in any departure from the random walk, following prior literature 
(e.g., Boehmer and Kelley 2009) we examine the quantity |VR-1|. A smaller deviation from 
random walk pricing implies a smaller divergence of prices from the unbiased estimate of the 
fundamental value; thus a lower level of |VR-1| indicates higher informational efficiency. We 
present results concerning VR(1,5) and VR(1,10).16 For ease of interpretation, we denote 
                                                     
14  For example, to estimate VR(1,5) over a 12-month estimation period we divide the sample variance of the 5-day return (calculated 
over the 12-months estimation period) by the sample variance of the 1-day return (calculated over the 12-months estimation period); 
we then divide the quantity by 5.  
15  To see the intuition, consider the simplest example of a variance ratio which relates the 2-day return variance to twice the 1-day 
return variance: VR(1,2)=Var[rt(2)]/(2*Var[rt]), where rt is the 1-day continuously compounded return, and rt(2)=rt+rt-1 is the 2-day 
return. Assume that the log of price, pt, follows a random walk, defined as pt=+pt-1+t, where t ~ i.i.d.(0,; this implies that also 
returns are i.i.d. Under this assumption, the variance ratio reduces to: VR(1,2)=(2Var[rt]+2Cov[rt,rt-1])/(2Var[rt])=1+(1)=1; where (1) 
is the first order autocorrelation of the 1-day return. Campbell et al. (1997) formally derive this result for any return frequency; they 
also derive the result using different definitions of random walk which do not assume that price increments are i.i.d. 
16  We repeat our analysis with variance ratios over different time horizons in our validation section and obtain similar inferences. 
14 
|VR(1,5)-1| multiplied by -1 as IE1 and |VR(1,10)-1| multiplied by -1 as IE2, so that a higher level 
of IE1 and IE2 indicates higher informational efficiency. 
As a second approach to studying the deviation from random walk pricing, we examine 
the autocorrelation of returns. We consider the first-order autocorrelation in 5-day and 10-day 
continuously compounded returns. If prices follow a random walk, the autocorrelation of returns 
at all frequencies should be equal to zero. Because both a positive and a negative autocorrelation 
of returns indicate a departure from random walk pricing, we focus on the absolute value of 
autocorrelation.17 The results obtained using stock return autocorrelation (untabulated) are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained using return variance ratios. 
Following, for example, Campbell et al. (1997), in the computation of our measures of 
deviation from random walk pricing, we use overlapping observations to improve the power of 
the tests. In the main analysis, we do not consider return horizons longer than ten days to reduce 
the probability that the results might be affected by time-varying expectations on the returns.18 
However, in additional analyses, we also provide consistent results for variance ratios using 
longer time horizons (e.g., |VR(1,20)-1| or |VR(1,30)-1|).  
We compute our informational efficiency measures over the 12-month period beginning 
three months after the end of the fiscal year. We use this time adjustment to ensure that financial 
statements are available to the public. 
                                                     
17  The deviation of the single return autocorrelations from zero is conceptually closely related to the deviation of the variance ratios 
from one because, as described above, if autocorrelations at all lags are equal to zero, variance ratios are equal to one. Accordingly, 
we find that our informational efficiency measures and the absolute value of return autocorrelations multiplied by -1 are highly 
positively correlated. Specifically, the Pearson correlation coefficient between IE1 (IE2) and the absolute value of the 5-day (10-day) 
return autocorrelation multiplied by -1 is equal to 0.449 (0.263). The correlation coefficients are different from zero at the 1% level. 
18  Griffin et al. (2010) argue that focusing on variance ratios based on return-horizons from one day to five weeks reduces the 
likelihood that results are influenced by time-varying expected returns. Cochrane (2001), Ahn et al. (2002), Anderson (2011), and 
Anderson et al. (2012) suggest that time-varying expected returns only affect the autocorrelation of long horizon returns. 
15 
Relating managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency 
In our main analysis, we examine the association between managerial discretion in 
accruals and informational efficiency by estimating the following regression model: 
 IEt = β0 + β1ABSDAt−1 + β2SIZEt−1 + β3ILLIQt−1 + β4TURNt−1
+ β5NASDAQt + β6INSTt−1 + εt 
(2) 
where: 
IE = Measures of stock price informational efficiency, computed as |VR(n,m)-1| multiplied 
by -1; where VR(n,m) is the return variance ratio, i.e. n/m times the ratio of the m-day return 
variance to the n-day return variance. IE1 is computed using VR(1,5) and IE2 using 
VR(1,10). Both measures are calculated over the 12-month period beginning three months 
after the end of the previous fiscal year. 
ABSDA =  Measure of the magnitude of discretionary accruals; computed as the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals obtained following Kothari et al. (2005). 
SIZE = Log of market value of equity; market value of equity is computed as the market price of 
shares at the end of the fiscal year times the number of common shares outstanding. 
ILLIQ = Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio; computed as the average of daily absolute stock return per 
dollar trading volume. The measure is calculated over the 12-month period corresponding 
to the fiscal year. 
TURN = Log of share turnover; where share turnover is computed as the number of shares traded 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. The measure is calculated over the 12-month 
period corresponding to the fiscal year. 
NASDAQ = Dummy variable coded 1 for stocks traded on NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. 
INST =  Institutional ownership; computed as the average of the quarter-end percentage of 
common shares outstanding held by institutional investors in a fiscal year. 
 
In addition to our proxies for informational efficiency (IE1, IE2) and for the extent of 
managerial discretion in accruals (ABSDA), we add a set of control variables identified by prior 
literature to be associated with our informational efficiency measures. SIZE is the log of market 
value of equity at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat PRCC_F*CSHO); firm size has been 
consistently documented to be negatively related to the price deviation from a random walk 
(French and Roll 1986; Keim and Stambaugh 1986; Boehmer and Kelley 2009; Griffin et al. 2010; 
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Kadapakkam et al. 2015); a common explanation is that larger firms are easier to value and this 
increases informational efficiency (Boehmer and Wu 2013).19 ILLIQ is the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity ratio, computed as the annual average of daily absolute stock return per dollar trading 
volume; illiquidity, because of higher transaction costs, reduces the incentives for arbitrage trades 
and can cause deviations of prices from an unbiased estimate of the fundamental value (Griffin 
et al. 2010).20 TURN is the log of share turnover (Compustat CSHTR_F/CSHO); similar to larger 
firms, the valuation process is easier for stocks with higher trading activity, implied by greater 
turnover, thus increasing informational efficiency (Boehmer and Wu 2013).21 NASDAQ is a 
dummy variable for stocks traded on NASDAQ; the variable is added to control for the potential 
effect of cross-market differences in trading structure on the results. INST is the average 
institutional ownership during the fiscal year obtained from Thomson Financial’s 13F-filings 
database; Boehmer and Kelley (2009) document that stocks with greater institutional ownership 
are priced more efficiently.  
We estimate the model with OLS and present firm-clustered standard errors.22 We also 
include year and industry fixed effects. 
                                                     
19  As a robustness test, we also use the log of total assets, sales, and the number of employees as alternative size proxies. All our 
results remain unchanged. 
20 On a related note, it has also been documented that liquidity may affect managers’ incentives to exercise discretion over accruals. 
For example, Huang et al. (2016) find a positive relation between liquidity and signed discretionary accruals; they identify the effects 
of liquidity on takeover pressure and equity compensation as possible explanations for their findings. 
21  Following previous literature (e.g., Boehmer and Kelley 2009), we use the lagged value of the market variables (turnover and 
illiquidity ratio) to avoid endogeneity issues. Using the contemporaneous values does not change the results. 
22  Using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and year (Petersen 2009) does not change our inferences. As robustness check, we 
also estimated the model using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-step approach; inferences are unchanged. 
17 
4. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our main sample is obtained from Compustat and CRSP. We examine firms covering a 
20-year period, based on fiscal years, from 1988-2007; because we examine stock prices in the 12-
month period beginning three months after the end of the fiscal year, we use stock price data up 
to 2009. To compute our primary measure of discretionary accruals, we require at least 20 
observations with sufficient accounting data in CRSP/Compustat Merged for each industry-year, 
using the Fama-French 48 industries classification. Consistent with previous literature, we 
exclude financial firms.  
Table 1 describes the sample selection procedure and reports the distribution of the 
sample firms across industries and years. After excluding firm-years with insufficient data, we 
are left with a sample of 10,369 firms from 39 industries with 76,873 firm-year observations. The 
number of observations is fairly well distributed throughout the sample period and across 
industry groupings.23 
[Table 1] 
In an alternative specification of our model, we also require data on the number of analysts 
following (NAF) from I/B/E/S. Moreover, we need at least five consecutive firm-years of data to 
compute the standard deviation of cash flow from operations and the standard deviation of sales, 
our measures of a firm’s underlying operating volatility. These requirements reduce the sample 
for our alternative specification to 53,211 firm-year observations. 
                                                     
23  Excluding the only industry group representing more than 10% of the sample (Business Services, 11.95%) does not affect our results. 
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Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in later analyses. Descriptive 
statistics for our informational efficiency and discretionary accruals measures, as well as for our 
other variables, are consistent with prior literature examining U.S. stocks. IE1 has mean equal 
to -0.236 and median equal to -0.187; IE2 has mean equal to -0.302 and median equal to -0.260. 
Mean and median values of ABSDA are 0.066 and 0.042, respectively. 
[Table 2] 
5. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The Pearson (upper triangle) and Spearman (lower triangle) correlation coefficients 
between the variables are shown in Table 3. The univariate correlations indicate a negative 
relation between informational efficiency (IE1, IE2) and ABSDA. 
[Table 3] 
Previous research shows that both informational efficiency (e.g., Boehmer and Kelley 
2009; Kadapakkam et al. 2015) and the absolute value of abnormal accruals (e.g., Kothari et al. 
2005; Hribar and Nichols 2007) are significantly associated with firm size; this can lead to spurious 
associations between IE and ABSDA in the univariate analysis. To examine the relation between 
discretionary accruals and informational efficiency after partialling out the effect of firm size, we 
take a double sorting approach. Specifically, we first rank firms into three equally weighted 
portfolios based on firm size; then, within each size portfolio, we rank firms into three equally 
weighted portfolios based on the absolute value of abnormal accruals. Table 4 presents the results: 
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for each firm size portfolio, firms in the portfolio with the highest level of ABSDA show the 
highest level of IE. The results indicate a positive association between informational efficiency 
and the absolute value of abnormal accruals. These results emphasize the need to control for firm 
size when examining the association between IE and ABSDA. We also note that the effect of firm 
size on IE is substantially larger than the effect of ABSDA; this is consistent with the large size 
effect on informational efficiency found by prior literature (e.g., Boehmer and Kelley 2009; 
Kadapakkam et al. 2015).  
 [Table 4] 
This last finding is also confirmed by replicating the correlation analysis after 
orthogonalizing our measures of informational efficiency (IE1, IE2) and ABSDA with respect to 
SIZE. The results (untabulated) show that both the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients 
between IE and ABSDA are significantly positive at the 1% level. 
6. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Main analysis 
For our main analysis, we use a multiple regression model that controls for other cross-
sectional determinants of informational efficiency. We estimate equation (2), where we relate 
informational efficiency to the absolute value of abnormal accruals, and to a set of variables 
potentially affecting the price deviation from a random walk process. The results, presented in 
Table 5 (Model 1), show a positive and highly significant association between both measures of 
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price deviation from a random walk (IE1, IE2) and ABSDA. Thus, informational efficiency 
increases as the absolute value of abnormal accruals increases. In terms of economic magnitude, 
a one standard deviation change in absolute abnormal accruals corresponds to a change of 
approximately 3% in our informational efficiency measures.24 
[Table 5] 
The coefficients of the control variables have the expected sign. SIZE is positively 
associated with IE; i.e., larger firms have more informationally efficient prices. Furthermore, IE is 
negatively associated with ILLIQ (Amihud’s illiquidity ratio) and positively associated with 
TURN (turnover by volume); hence, more liquid stocks and more traded stocks exhibit a lower 
price deviation from a random walk. INST is positively associated with IE, indicating that stocks 
with greater institutional ownership are priced more efficiently. We also find that the market 
structure influences IE: NASDAQ (the dummy variable for stocks listed on NASDAQ) has a 
negative and significant coefficient. 
In an alternative specification of our main model, we consider additional control variables 
potentially affecting the relation between informational efficiency and the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals. As a further proxy for the richness of the information environment, we add 
the number of analysts following at the end of the fiscal year (NAF; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
2011). Furthermore, we control for potential confounding effects on the association between 
                                                     
24 These results indicate that, on average, managerial discretion in accruals has a beneficial effect on informational efficiency. An 
interesting question is how these results are affected by those firms that exercise a low level of discretion over accruals because their 
financial statements are highly informative without the use of discretion. We note that these settings would imply a negative 
association between managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency; therefore, it is unlikely that our results are driven 
by these firms.  
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ABSDA and IE relating to uncertainty from growth firms and distress firms by including the 
book-to-market ratio (BM) and Altman’s Z-Score. BM can be interpreted as a measure of long-
term growth opportunities that captures the extent to which current stock prices reflect future 
cash flows. A low value of BM indicates higher expected future cash flows, which in turn adds to 
the uncertainty in firm value and might affect our measures of deviation from random walk 
pricing. To consider financial distress as a further possible driver of uncertainty, we include 
Altman’s Z-Score (ALTZ) in the regression model. Hribar and Nichols (2007) show that the 
expected value of absolute discretionary accruals is an increasing function of the variance of 
signed discretionary accruals, and thus of operating volatility. To avoid a potential bias in the 
coefficient estimate of ABSDA due to operating volatility affecting both IE and ABSDA, we follow 
Hribar and Nichols (2007) and add cash flow volatility and sales volatility as proxies for operating 
volatility to our model. Finally, as our informational efficiency measures—through the return 
variance—might be affected by non-trading periods, we add the number of non-trading days 
(NTDAYS); these are identified as the days with zero returns in CRSP (Griffin et al. 2010). The 
measurement of all variables in our alternative specification is defined in Appendix A. 
The results of the alternative specification with additional control variables are presented 
in Table 5 (Model 2). The coefficient of ABSDA is positive and highly significant; hence, the 
positive association between informational efficiency and the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
is confirmed. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to notice that our multiple regression results of both models 
provide confidence in the validity of our measure of informational efficiency. The key 
determinants of informational efficiency identified by prior literature display the expected sign 
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of linear association with informational efficiency. Specifically, we find that informational 
efficiency is positively associated with firm size, turnover, institutional ownership, and the 
number of analysts following, whereas it is negatively associated with the Amihud illiquidity 
ratio and the number of non-trading days.25 
Cross-sectional variation in the association between informational efficiency and managerial 
discretion in accruals 
In this subsection, we examine the cross-sectional variation in the association between 
managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency. As potential drivers of the cross-
sectional variation, we consider proxies for the richness of the information environment and a 
sub-sample of observations where managerial discretion is likely to be less informative. This 
cross-sectional evidence allows us to further validate our interpretation of the association 
between managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency as being determined by 
the effect of managerial discretion on the informativeness of financial statements. 
The role of the information environment. Previous literature suggests that managers of firms 
in richer information environments have less need to use discretion in accounting numbers to 
communicate their private information (Arya et al. 2003; Louis and Robinson 2005). To test 
whether the information environment of a firm affects our findings on the association between 
informational efficiency and discretionary accruals, we use three proxies for the richness of the 
                                                     
25  We further investigate the association between our informational efficiency measures and the key determinants of informational 
efficiency mentioned above using a portfolio approach (untabulated). We build quintile portfolios based on each variable and compare 
the mean of our informational efficiency measures in the portfolios. We find that the mean of our informational efficiency measures 
monotonically increases with firm size, turnover, institutional ownership, and the number of analysts following, whereas it 
monotonically decreases with the Amihud illiquidity ratio and the number of non-trading days. 
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information environment: firm size (SIZE), the number of analysts following (NAF; Louis and 
Robinson 2005), and institutional ownership (INST; Boehmer and Kelley 2009). A higher value of 
the three variables represents a richer information environment. The results (see Table 6) show a 
negative coefficient for the interaction term between ABSDA and all the information environment 
proxies, consistent with the interpretation that discretionary accruals of firms with a richer 
information environment contain less private information and therefore have a less positive effect 
on the informational efficiency of stock prices.26 
[Table 6] 
Accrual-related restatements. We use a sample of restated financial statements identified 
from Audit Analytics’ Non-Reliance Restatements database where the primary reason for 
restatement is related to accrual accounting.27 Since restatement data in Audit Analytics is 
available starting from 2000 only, this reduces our sample to 29,161 observations in the period 
from 2000 to 2007. For this period, we identify 1,639 accrual-related restatements.28 To examine 
the effect of restatements on the association between IE and ABSDA, we include a dummy 
variable for restatements (REST) into our main model and interact REST with ABSDA29 and all 
control variables. The results (see last columns of Table 6) indicate that the interaction term 
                                                     
26 We note that the significance of the association is at the 1% (5%) level for SIZE, at the 1% (5%) level for INST for IE1 (IE2), and at the 
5% (insignificant) level for NAF. We also repeated this analysis using our alternative specification (i.e., Model 2 in Table 5) and all 
results remain significant except the interaction term ABSDA*NAF, which is still negative but not significant at conventional levels. 
27  We examine restatements filed between 2000-2011. Restatements are classified as accrual-related if Audit Analytics’ item 
RES_ACC_RES_FKEY_LIST is 1, 6, 7, 12, or 14, where 1 is “depreciation, depletion or amortization errors”, 6 is “revenue recognition 
issues”, 7 is “expense (payroll, SGA, other) recording issues”, 12 is “liabilities, payables, reserves, and accrual estimate failures”, and 
14 is “accounts/loans receivable, investments, & cash issues”. 
28  We also repeated the analysis considering only observations where financial statements are restated after the period used to 
estimate informational efficiency. The results (untabulated) are qualitatively unchanged. 
29  ABSDA is calculated, consistent with the main analysis, using data from the originally reported financial statements. 
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between ABSDA and REST is negative and significant at the 1% (5%) level for IE1 (IE2). In 
addition, the coefficient of ABSDA for restatement firms (β1 + β3) is negative and significant at the 
5% level.30 These results suggest that when accruals are misstated the positive association 
between our measure of managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency not only 
decreases in magnitude, but becomes negative; thus, in this sub-sample, a larger use of 
managerial discretion in accruals adversely affects information efficiency. 
7. VALIDITY TESTS  
Validity of the measures of informational efficiency  
We use variance ratios as our main measures to capture informational efficiency. Despite 
the fact that variance ratios are well-established and widely used in the finance literature (see 
recent research by O’Hara and Ye 2011; Saffi and Sigurdsson 2011; Boehmer et al. 2015; Conrad 
et al. 2015; Kadapakkam et al. 2015), a study by Griffin et al. (2010) questions the construct validity 
of variance ratios based on their counter-intuitive empirical findings for an international setting. 
Although their results are potentially specific to their setting (Kadapakkam et al. 2015), Griffin et 
al. (2010) also discuss conceptual limitations of informational efficiency measures that can lead to 
misleading inferences in our setting. In particular, they show that variance ratios are potentially 
unsuitable as a measure of informational efficiency if the incorporation of information into stock 
prices is extremely slow; therefore, alternative explanations for our results may exist.31 
                                                     
30 Using our alternative specification with additional control variables (i.e., Model 2 in Table 5) yields similar results. 
31 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point. 
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To address this issue, we conduct further robustness tests to ensure that our results are 
not due to extremely slow information incorporation. First, we repeat our main analysis on 
several sub-samples in which an extremely slow incorporation of information is unlikely. The 
sub-samples are formed based on firm-specific characteristics that prior literature has related to 
high (relative) informational efficiency. These characteristics reflect two fundamental building 
blocks of informational efficiency—transaction and information costs (Griffin et al. 2010). Second, 
we compute additional variance ratios relating to different time horizons. In particular, extending 
the base period of the variance ratios should increase confidence that our results are not driven 
by an extremely slow incorporation of information. Third, we repeat our analysis using an 
alternative measure of informational efficiency following Hasbrouck (1993), which is obtained 
from a structural model of prices and trades using intra-day data. 
Sub-samples where slow incorporation of information is unlikely  
We expect that extremely slow information incorporation into stock prices is unlikely for 
sub-samples of stocks with large firm size, high liquidity, high trading volume, high institutional 
ownership, a large number of analysts following, and the possibility to trade stock options. Stocks 
of large firms and stocks with higher trading volume may be easier to value, thereby 
incorporating information faster (Boehmer and Wu 2013). High liquidity has been found to 
stimulate arbitrage trading and thus to increase efficiency (Chordia et al. 2008). Furthermore, 
sophisticated market participants, such as institutional investors and analysts, are expected to 
facilitate information incorporation into prices (Boehmer and Kelley 2009). In addition, prior 
literature finds that options trading facilitates informational efficiency (Watt et al. 1992; Truong 
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2012). Specifically, Truong (2012) finds that options trading increases the extent to which stock 
prices reflect future earnings due to private information flowing from the derivative markets to 
the market for the underlying security.  
To empirically test whether our positive association also holds when we exclude stocks 
with potentially extremely slow information incorporation, we use sub-samples of firm-year 
observations with (1) more than median market capitalization (our measure of firm size), (2) less 
than median Amihud illiquidity ratio (our main measure of liquidity), (3) less than median non-
trading days (our alternative measure of liquidity), (4) more than median turnover (our measure 
of trading volume), (5) more than median institutional ownership, (6) more than two sell-side 
analysts following, (7) options trading available.32 The results in Table 7 show that our inferences 
hold in all sub-samples; in particular, the coefficient on ABSDA is significantly positive at the 1% 
level in each of the sub-samples. 
[Table 7] 
Variance ratios at different time horizons  
In addition to our main variance ratio measures that relate 5-day (10-day) return variances 
to 5 (10) times the 1-day return variance, we compute additional variance ratios by increasing the 
horizon of the base period, i.e., VR(2,5), VR(2,10), VR(5,10), and the horizon of the returns used 
at the denominator, i.e., VR(1,20) and VR(1,30). By increasing the horizon of the base period, n, 
                                                     
32  We obtain data on options from Option Metrics; because data is only available starting from 1996, there is a substantial decrease in 
sample size. It is interesting to notice that a dummy variable for optioned firms (OPT) is highly positively correlated with our 
informational efficiency measures. The Pearson correlation coefficient between OPT and IE1 (IE2) is equal to 0.293 (0.265) and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Because options trading has been found to be positively associated with informational 
efficiency, this result brings further support to the interpretation of IE1 and IE2 as measures of informational efficiency.  
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the likelihood that only a small portion of the information is incorporated into prices in the base 
period decreases. Furthermore, increasing the horizon of the returns used at the denominator, m, 
allows us to examine the effect of extending the number of lags used to form the variance ratios. 
Panel A in Table 8 reports the results for variance ratios at different horizons. Our findings hold 
for variance ratios at different horizons. This provides further confidence in the validity of the 
informational efficiency measures in our context. 
 [Table 8] 
A structural model of prices and trades to estimate informational efficiency 
We also consider a transaction-based measure of informational efficiency, Hasbrouck’s 
(1993) pricing error. This measure of informational efficiency has been used by prior research in 
different fields (e.g., Kumar et al. 1998; Boehmer and Kelley 2009; Boehmer and Wu 2013; 
Boehmer et al. 2015; Gozluklu et al. 2015) and does not suffer from the conceptual limitations of 
the informational efficiency measures discussed in Griffin et al. (2010).  
The measure is calculated by estimating a structural model of prices and trades using 
intra-day data obtained from TAQ. Because of computational limits associated with calculating 
the measure, we focus on one randomly selected month per fiscal year for the first eight years 
with available data.33 The estimation procedures are described in Appendix B. 
                                                     
33 TAQ data are available to us only starting from 1996; therefore, we consider fiscal years from 1995 to 2002. Furthermore, we restrict 
the analysis to firms with fiscal year-end in December. For each fiscal year, we randomly select one month in the estimation period 
used for IE1 and IE2. We divide the 12-month estimation period into four quarters and we select the month in different quarters in 
groups of four years. Specifically, the selected months are November 1996, August 1997, June 1998, January 2000, November 2001, 
March 2002, September 2002, and April 2003. 
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This approach to examining informational efficiency relies on a model where the log of 
transaction price is decomposed into an efficient price component (which is a random walk) and 
a pricing error. The measure of informational efficiency is based on the inverse of the magnitude 
of the pricing error. The variance of the pricing error can be obtained by estimating a VAR model 
involving the change in price, and trade characteristics. Following prior literature (e.g., Boehmer 
and Wu 2013), we focus on the ratio of the standard deviation of the pricing error to the standard 
deviation of the log of price, which can be interpreted as the proportion of deviations from the 
efficient price in the total variability of the observable transaction price process. We define the 
measure of informational efficiency, denoted as IE3, as negative one multiplied by the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the pricing error to the standard deviation of the log of price; therefore, a 
high level of IE3 implies higher informational efficiency. 
IE3 in our sample has a mean equal to -0.069 and a standard deviation of 0.093; these 
figures are comparable to those reported by prior literature for U.S. markets (e.g., Boehmer and 
Kelley 2009; Boehmer and Wu 2013). The Spearman (Pearson) correlation between IE3 and our 
informational efficiency measures is equal to 0.313 (0.260) for IE1 and to 0.283 (0.248) for IE2, 
respectively; all correlation coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. We 
interpret the substantial positive correlation between IE3 and our measure of informational 
efficiency as a further validation of IE1 and IE2 as informational efficiency measures. 
We replicate our main analysis using IE3 as dependent variable. The results are reported 
in Panel B of Table 8. The coefficient of ABSDA is positive and highly significant, confirming the 
results obtained with our main measures of informational efficiency. The results for IE1 and IE2 
for the sample used to estimate IE3 (see last two columns of Table 8, Panel B) suggest that the 
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results for IE3 are not due to an exceptionally strong association between informational efficiency 
and managerial discretion in accruals in the restricted sample. 
Validity of the measure of managerial discretion in accruals  
The effect of operating volatility and unusual events on the estimation of discretionary accruals  
To measure the extent to which managers exercise discretion over accruals, we rely on a 
widely used model based on Jones (1991) as modified by Kothari et al. (2005). However, Jones-
type models have come under much scrutiny as to misspecification problems with respect to the 
firms’ underlying accrual generating process, particularly in the presence of exceptional business 
circumstances (e.g., Bernard and Skinner 1996; Owens et al. 2016). As a result, these models 
potentially misclassify non-discretionary accruals as discretionary, which manifests in 
implausibly large magnitudes of discretionary accruals (Ball 2013; Owens et al. 2016). Therefore, 
a major concern is that our results are not attributable to managerial discretion in accruals, but 
rather to underlying economic events correlated with the misclassification of discretionary 
accruals and our dependent variable of interest (i.e., informational efficiency). 
To mitigate potential misclassification issues, prior empirical studies include controls for 
firm performance and operating volatility, in particular when using unsigned measures of 
discretionary accruals. We control for firm performance by including (lagged) return on assets 
directly into the discretionary accruals estimation model (Kothari et al. 2005); following Hribar 
and Nichols (2007), we include the standard deviation of cash flows and the standard deviation 
of sales in our extended model to control for operating volatility. However, accruals arising from 
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unusual business circumstances, such as business model shocks, can still introduce severe biases 
into both unsigned and signed discretionary accruals (Owens et al. 2016).  
To mitigate concerns that unusual business circumstances drive our results, we identify 
and exclude firm-year observations that experienced a shock to their business model (about 18% 
of our sample) following Owens et al. (2016).34 Specifically, we exclude firm-year observations 
that have (1) major acquisitions, (2) large discontinued operations, (3) four-digit SIC industry 
changes, (4) large restructuring charges, and (5) large special items. The results in Table 9 show 
that our findings are not only robust to operating volatility, but also to potential misspecification 
problems in the discretionary accruals model arising from business model shocks. 
[Table 9] 
Alternative calculation of total accruals 
We also repeat our main analysis calculating total accruals using the cash flow approach 
as proposed by Hribar and Collins (2002). Specifically, we compute total accruals from the cash 
flow statement as net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(Compustat IBC) minus cash flow from operations before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (Compustat OANCF-XIDOC). The coefficient of ABSDA is 0.080 (t-value 10.25) using 
IE1 and 0.089 (t-value 9.73) using IE2. Thus, our inference regarding the association between 
managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency is unchanged. 
                                                     
34  According to Owens et al. (2016), these shocks can affect accruals over multiple years. Therefore, we repeat our analysis excluding 
all firm-year observations that have at least one of the indicators in the current or in the prior year. Our results remain unchanged. 
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Alternative models to estimate discretionary accruals 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), in the main analysis, we control for a potential 
misspecification of prior accrual models for firms with extreme performance by including the 
lagged return on assets (ROAt-1). Alternatively, we use cash flow from operations and book-to-
market ratio to control for firm performance and growth opportunities (Larcker et al. 2007) 
instead of lagged ROA. Additionally, we use various alternative models used in previous 
literature to estimate discretionary accruals (i.e., Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Xie 2001; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2006). Our results are robust with respect to different accrual models. 
8. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Time sub-samples. To examine the stability of our results over time, we split the sample in 
two periods of ten years (1988-1997 and 1998-2007) and four periods of five years (1988-1992, 
1993-1997, 1998-2002, 2003-2007). The coefficient of ABSDA is positive and significant at the 1% 
level in all sub-periods, although the magnitude of the coefficient is higher in earlier periods.35   
Profit vs. loss firms. We repeat our main analysis on profit firms and loss firms separately.36 
The association between informational efficiency and managerial discretion in accruals is weaker 
for loss firms, but the coefficient of ABSDA (0.057, t-value 4.29, using IE1 and 0.063, t-value 4.02, 
using IE2) is still positive and significant at the 1% level.37 One potential explanation for the lower 
                                                     
35 When using IE1, the coefficient of ABSDA is 0.140 (t-value 10.24) in 1988-1997; 0.065 (t-value 5.57) in 1998-2007. When using IE2, the 
coefficient of ABSDA is 0.149 (t-value 9.63) in 1988-1997; 0.080 (t-value 5.51) in 1998-2007. 
36  A firm is considered a loss firm if net income before extraordinary items is less than zero. Loss firms represent 32.47% of our sample. 
37  For firms with positive earnings the coefficient of ABSDA is 0.130 (t-value 10.27) for IE1 and 0.146 (t-value 9.89) for IE2. 
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coefficient is that managers of loss firms engage in big bath accounting using their discretion over 
accruals to create reserves for future periods (e.g., Healy 1985). 
Positive vs. negative discretionary accruals. Different signs of discretionary accruals may 
reflect different underlying financial reporting motivations, and thus, have potentially different 
implications for the information value of discretionary accruals. However, segmenting the 
analysis by income-increasing and income-decreasing abnormal accruals does not change our 
inferences regarding the association between informational efficiency and the extent of 
discretionary accruals. The coefficient for ABSDA in the positive discretionary accruals sample is 
0.111 (0.123) using IE1 (IE2) with a t-value of 9.28 (8.83), whereas the coefficient for ABSDA in the 
negative discretionary accruals sample using IE1 (IE2) is 0.079 (0.085) with a t-value of 5.91 (5.34). 
These findings suggest that both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals convey useful information to the market. 
Discretionary vs. non-discretionary accruals. As a further sensitivity test, we examine the 
association between informational efficiency and the non-discretionary portion of total accruals. 
We follow the design used in the main analysis and add the absolute value of normal (non-
discretionary) accruals (ABSNDA) to the model. The results show that the coefficient of ABSNDA 
is positive and significantly different from zero. The magnitude and the significance of the 
coefficient of ABSDA are essentially unchanged. Furthermore, prior literature (e.g., Francis et al. 
2004, 2005) documents that discretionary accruals identified using Jones-type models are 
potentially affected by “innate factors”, i.e. variables that are not related to discretionary choices. 
Therefore, we also replicate our analysis using the residuals of a regression relating ABSDA to 
the innate factors used by Francis et al. (2004) as measure of managerial discretion in accruals. 
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The innate factors are firm size, operating cycle, capital intensity, intangible intensity, a dummy 
variable for the absence of intangibles, standard deviation of cash flow from operations, standard 
deviation of sales and number of negative earnings; the last three variables are calculated using 
the last five years. Inference on the association between ABSDA and IE is unchanged. 
Informational efficiency and managerial discretion in accruals: intra-year variation. In the main 
analysis we concentrate on informational efficiency in the 12-month period beginning three 
months after the end of the fiscal year. Here, we divide this period into quarters and examine the 
association between IE and ABSDA separately for each quarter. We find a positive association 
between IE and ABSDA in all quarters.38 The magnitude of the positive ABSDA coefficient is 
highest in the second quarter, i.e. between the seventh and the ninth month after the end of the 
fiscal year. In the third and in the fourth quarter, the positive association is weaker but still highly 
significant. These findings suggest a decrease in the informativeness of discretionary accruals 
over time. The high significance of the ABSDA coefficient over the whole year also indicates that 
the association between informational efficiency and discretionary accruals goes beyond the 
period most affected by the post-earnings announcement drift. Specifically, most studies 
document that the drift is concentrated between the first quarter and the end of the second quarter 
after earnings announcements (see, for a survey, Richardson et al. 2010). 
Excluding information days. To further examine the timing of the effects of discretionary 
choices in accrual reporting on price discovery we replicate the analysis excluding the three days 
around earnings announcements (identified using Compustat RDQ). Our findings remain 
                                                     
38  When using IE1, the coefficient of ABSDA is 0.091 (t-value 8.10) in the first quarter; 0.100 (t-value 9.06) in the second quarter; 0.058 
(t-value 5.02) in the third quarter; 0.071 (t-value 5.48) in the fourth quarter. When using IE2, the coefficient of ABSDA is 0.092 (t-value 
5.86) in the first quarter; 0.109 (t-value 7.99) in the second quarter; 0.058 (t-value 4.04) in the third quarter; 0.065 (t-value 2.32) in the 
fourth quarter. 
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unchanged; this suggests that our main results are not driven by the time period around which 
the market response to accounting information is strongest.  
Informational efficiency and managerial discretion in quarterly accruals. In addition to our main 
analysis using annual data, we investigate the relation between managerial discretion in quarterly 
accruals (ABSDAQ) and informational efficiency.39 Using our main model in equation (2), we 
relate ABSDAQ to informational efficiency in the period between the corresponding quarterly 
earnings announcement and the following quarterly earnings announcement. In the model, we 
add dummy variables for the quarters. The dates of the quarterly earnings announcements are 
obtained from Compustat (RDQ); we remove observations where the quarterly announcement 
for the fourth quarter was issued more than 90 days after quarter end or more than 60 days after 
quarter end for the first three quarters. Consistent with the analysis using annual data, the results 
show that the coefficient on ABSDAQ is positive and significantly different from zero with a t-
value of 2.73 (2.38) for IE1 (IE2). The association is weaker than in the main analysis, suggesting 
that quarterly discretionary accruals carry less information than annual discretionary accruals. 
The role of the perceived reliability of financial statements. The price deviation from a random 
walk pattern can also be affected by the extent to which investors rely on and use the information 
in accounting numbers. Therefore, a systematic relation between ABSDA and the perceived 
reliability of financial statements could influence our results. We control for the reliability of 
financial statements as perceived by investors using the absolute value of the three-day abnormal 
return around the annual earnings announcement and the ratio of the three-day abnormal return 
                                                     
39 We measure quarterly discretionary accruals (ABSDAQ) following Collins et al. (2016). 
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to the earnings surprise as an indicator for reliability.40 Adding any of the two variables to the 
main model, inference regarding the ABSDA coefficient is unchanged. The coefficient of the 
absolute value of abnormal returns is positive and significant, whereas the coefficient of the ratio 
of the absolute abnormal return to the earnings surprise is insignificantly different from zero. 
Further alternative control variables. As an alternative measure of liquidity we use the annual 
average of the daily percentage bid-ask spread, which is measured as the difference between the 
closing ask and bid price divided by the midquote. As a further alternative measure of liquidity, 
we use the estimator of the bid-ask spread developed by Corwin and Schultz (2012), which is 
based on daily high and low prices. We use leverage as an alternative control variable for financial 
distress since highly leveraged firms are presumably more likely to go bankrupt (Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam 2011).41 We also use two alternative controls for firms’ growth options, Tobin’s Q 
and sales growth, and exclude firms with an Altman Z-Score below 1.81 to ensure that growth or 
distress firms do not drive our results. The results obtained using these alternative specifications 
are qualitatively the same as in the main analysis.  
Market-adjusted returns. Following a wide body of prior literature (e.g., Campbell et al. 
1997) we use raw returns to calculate variance ratios in the main analysis. We also repeat the 
analysis using market-adjusted returns, which are defined as the raw return minus the value 
weighted return in CRSP. Inference regarding the association between ABSDA and informational 
                                                     
40  The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual return and the value-weighted return on the stocks in the same 
capitalization decile (as provided by CRSP). We focus on the period from day -1 to day +1 around an earnings announcement. The 
earnings surprise is defined as earnings per share minus the median consensus in analysts’ forecasts, divided by the stock price. We 
also replicated the analysis using raw returns and the results are virtually unchanged. 
41  As additional control variables we consider: the log of the stock price at the end of the fiscal year; cash flow from operations, both 
signed and in absolute value; the standard deviation of monthly returns in the period used to calculate the informational efficiency 
measures and in the prior 12 months; the standard deviation of annual returns calculated using returns in the last five years; IE1 and 
IE2 in the previous year. The results are unchanged.  
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efficiency is unchanged. This suggests that our results are not driven by the relation between the 
market return and individual stock returns. 
Penny stocks. Penny stocks (with a price lower than one dollar) have often been 
documented as being related to extreme illiquidity and pricing anomalies. Accordingly, we also 
replicate the analysis excluding penny stocks; untabulated findings are qualitatively analogous. 
General managerial discretion and discretionary accruals. For an alternative proxy of 
managerial discretion, we consider a widely used industry discretion index (MDSCORE) 
developed by Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). This index measures the effect of executives on 
the organizational outcome within an industry. It is based on ratings of the overall managerial 
discretion in 17 industries; the ratings are given by a panel of securities analysts specialized in 
these industries and by academic experts. Using industry determinants of discretion theoretically 
proposed by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) extend the 
17-industry index by 53 additional industries, resulting in a final index encompassing 70 four-
digit-SIC code industries.42 The index uses a seven-point scale, where higher levels of MDSCORE 
indicate greater managerial discretion. As the index is only available for 70 four-digit-SIC code 
industries, our sample is limited to 36,498 observations from these industries. Using a model with 
the same set of control variables as in our main analysis, the coefficient of MDSCORE is positive 
and highly significant. This finding is consistent with our main results: the extent of managerial 
discretion is positively associated with informational efficiency.43 
                                                     
42  The extended index is presented in Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella (2009). 
43  We also replicated the main analysis including MDSCORE as additional control variable. The inference regarding the association 
between managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency is qualitatively unchanged. 
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9. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
In this section, we discuss how our results are related to prior accounting literature dealing 
with various aspects of informational efficiency and accrual-based managerial discretion. In 
particular, we empirically evaluate how our results relate to recent work by Callen et al. (2013) 
that examines the association between accruals quality and price delay, a measure of information 
efficiency developed by Hou and Moskowitz (2005) that focuses on the speed of adjustment to 
market-wide information. Furthermore, we investigate how idiosyncratic volatility is related to 
our results. Finally, we discuss the relation between our results and the findings of prior research 
on discretionary accruals and the post-earnings announcement drift, the absolute value of excess 
returns, and the accrual anomaly. 
Price delay 
Hou and Moskowitz (2005) develop a firm-specific measure of price delay that reflects the 
annual average delay with which weekly stock returns reflect market-wide news of the past four 
weeks. Callen et al. (2013) employ this measure to examine whether accounting quality explains 
some of the cross-sectional variation in price delay. Their findings suggest that poor accounting 
quality is positively related to price delay. Although our measure of managerial discretion in 
accruals (ABSDA) is conceptionally different from their main measure of accounting quality, i.e., 
accrual quality (AQ), measured as the inverse of the standard deviation of the residuals from the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, prior literature has documented a considerable positive 
correlation between the two measures suggesting that they have a common component. 
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To evaluate how our results relate to the results in Callen et al. (2013), we replicate their 
main analysis using ABSDA instead of AQ.44ABSDA is significantly positively associated with 
the price delay measure at the 5% level with a coefficient of 0.023 (t-value 2.03); this indicates that 
stock price delay increases in the magnitude of discretionary accruals. However, we further 
follow their suggestion to include additional controls (i.e., firm size, σ(CFO), σ(Sales), the length 
of the operating cycle, and the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio) to address concerns that the accruals-
based measures mainly capture firm’s innate operating characteristics and to appropriately 
control for the effect of liquidity on the price discovery process. Our results for ABSDA in this 
specification now turn insignificant with a coefficient of 0.005 (t-value 0.43), while AQ is still 
significantly positively associated with price delay.45 This suggests that AQ and ABSDA are 
related to price delay in a substantially different way. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the 
coefficient on ABSDA is significantly negative when we add firm-fixed effects (-0.018, 
t-value -2.02). 
In addition to the differences in the accrual measures, our main measures of informational 
efficiency, i.e. variance ratios, differ substantially from Hou and Moskowitz’s (2005) price delay 
measures that are based on lower frequency week-to-week return patterns and deal with one 
specific type of information, namely market-wide information. 
                                                     
44 The results from our replication using AQ are comparable to the results presented in Table 4 of Callen et al. (2013). The coefficient 
on AQ for the regression model in column (1) of Table 4 is 0.830 (t-value 7.97) and 0.213 (t-value 5.06) for the model in column (2). 
Differences between our replication results and the original results in Callen et al. (2013) are potentially attributable to the fact that 
data on one control variable, the breadth of mutual fund ownership, is not available to us. 
45 AQ in our replication is significantly positively associated with price delay at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.170 (t-value 3.38). 
39 
Idiosyncratic volatility 
Idiosyncratic stock return volatility has been proposed as a measure of informational 
efficiency. Hence, our analysis is related to prior research investigating the relation between 
idiosyncratic return volatility and discretionary accruals; the findings of these studies are mixed. 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) and Chen et al. (2012) find that idiosyncratic return volatility 
is positively associated with the absolute value of abnormal accruals; conversely, Hutton et al. 
(2009) document a negative association. Relatedly, Li et al. (2014) discuss how the conflicting 
evidence can be reconciled. Yet, the interpretation of idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of price 
efficiency is controversial.46  
The deviation of prices from a random walk pattern is different from idiosyncratic 
volatility. Chae et al. (2013) present a formal comparison of idiosyncratic volatility and variance 
ratios. However, we also examine the relation between idiosyncratic volatility, discretionary 
accruals and the price deviation from a random walk pattern, our main measure of informational 
efficiency in our sample. Following the standard approach in previous literature (Ang et al. 2006; 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2011), we measure idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation 
of residuals of the Fama-French three-factor model, calculated using daily returns. We relate 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) to ABSDA and to the cross-sectional determinants of informational 
efficiency. We find that IVOL is positively and highly significantly associated with ABSDA, i.e. 
                                                     
46  One group of works argues that greater idiosyncratic volatility implies greater price informativeness (Morck et al. 2000; Durnev et 
al. 2003; Jin and Myers 2006). A second stream of studies contends that greater idiosyncratic volatility indicates a poorer information 
environment (West 1988; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999; Brown and Kapadia 2007; Dasgupta et al. 2010); consistent with this 
view, it has been suggested that idiosyncratic volatility reflects noise trading (Roll 1988; Kelly 2014) or limits to arbitrage (Pontiff 1996, 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 2002, and Mashruwala et al. 2006). Lee and Liu (2011) try to reconcile the different views on idiosyncratic 
volatility and price informativeness; they develop a model showing that idiosyncratic volatility has either a U-shaped or negative 
relation with price informativeness; using six widely used price informativeness measures, they also document a U-shaped relation 
between idiosyncratic volatility and price informativeness. 
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idiosyncratic volatility increases with the extent to which managers exercise discretion over 
accruals.  
To further investigate the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and a price deviation 
from a random walk pattern, we examine the correlation between IVOL and IE for different 
quartiles of IE obtained by sorting firms in each year separately. Consistent with Lee and Liu 
(2011), we find that IE exhibits a U-shaped relation with IVOL. More specifically, in the lower 
three quartiles of IE, the correlation between IE and IVOL is negative; in the highest quartile of 
IE the correlation between IE and IVOL is positive.   
Post-earnings-announcement drift 
Francis et al. (2007) find that a disproportionate amount of post-earnings-announcement 
drift (PEAD) returns is associated with stocks characterized by high information uncertainty. In 
sensitivity tests, they use the absolute value of abnormal accruals as measure of information 
uncertainty. Their results imply that a specific form of inefficiency (the PEAD) is positively 
associated with the absolute value of abnormal accruals.47 We argue that our approach to 
measuring informational efficiency is different from that adopted by Francis et al. (2007). First, 
we focus on a 12-month period after the earnings announcement while most prior literature 
documents that the drift is concentrated in the first six months. As described in Section 8, we 
observe a significantly positive association between ABSDA and IE for each of the quarters of the 
period used to estimate informational efficiency. Second, the PEAD only captures one specific 
                                                     
47  Shivakumar (2007), in his discussion of Francis et al. (2007), suggests a possible explanation of the results that is unrelated to 
information uncertainty. He notices that the proxies used to measure information uncertainty are positively related to the volatility 
of earnings; a higher volatility of earnings leads to a higher likelihood that a firm experiences extreme earnings surprises and is 
classified in the extreme quantiles used to implement the PEAD trading strategy. 
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form of inefficiency (i.e., positive autocorrelation in returns), whereas our measure of 
informational efficiency captures any deviation from a random walk pattern. 
Absolute value of excess returns 
Perotti and Wagenhofer (2014) use the absolute value of excess returns, calculated as the 
deviation from the Fama-French (1993) three factor model augmented with momentum (Carhart 
1997), as a measure of mispricing. Perotti and Wagenhofer (2014) find that the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals is positively associated with future absolute value of excess returns; their 
findings suggests that a specific aspect of mispricing, namely the deviation of stock returns from 
the expectations deriving from a widely used asset pricing model, increases as managerial 
discretion in accruals increases. We note that their measure captures a different return pattern 
than that examined by our measures; specifically, the existence of non-zero absolute excess 
returns does not necessarily imply a deviation from the random walk benchmark. We also control 
in our main model for the absolute value of excess returns, calculated following Perotti and 
Wagenhofer (2014) in the period used to estimate informational efficiency; the results are 
qualitatively unchanged. 
The discretionary accrual anomaly 
The accrual anomaly—the tendency of stocks of firms in the bottom tail of the accrual 
distribution to outperform stocks of firms in the top tail of the accrual distribution—is one of the 
most pervasive market anomalies based on financial accounting information. The anomaly has 
also been found for discretionary accruals (Xie 2001). Our results suggest that the discretionary 
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accrual anomaly is distinct from the association between the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
and the deviation of the price from a random walk. Specifically, the anomaly has been 
documented in the tails of the discretionary accrual distribution; this implies that stock prices of 
firms with discretionary accruals in the tails of the distribution are less informationally efficient 
than stock prices of the other firms. Hence, the discretionary accrual anomaly should bias against 
finding our results, which instead indicate a positive association between the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals and informational efficiency. We also repeat our analysis excluding the 
observations in the extreme deciles based on signed abnormal accruals; we follow this approach 
because most literature documents the anomaly for the extreme deciles of the distribution. The 
results are qualitatively analogous to the main findings. 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
Informational efficiency is a fundamental aspect of market quality and of the capital 
allocation and investment decision process. Financial reporting may play a crucial role in 
determining the extent to which prices reflect available information. Relatedly, calls for more 
research on the accounting determinants of informational efficiency have been raised by, among 
others, Kothari (2001), Lee (2001), and Richardson et al. (2010). This paper examines how an 
important aspect of the accounting process, namely the amount of discretion exercised by 
managers in accrual reporting, affects informational efficiency. 
A longstanding debate among academics, regulators, and practitioners is centered on the 
informativeness of managerial discretion in accounting earnings—which is mainly determined 
by the accrual component. One side of the debate argues that discretionary accruals communicate 
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useful information to market participants; the other side of the debate contends that investors are 
more often than not misled by accrual-based discretion in financial reporting. Understanding 
what is the prevailing effect of managerial discretion in accruals on the informativeness of 
financial statements, and therefore on informational efficiency, is an empirical question.  
We measure the magnitude of managerial discretion in accruals by the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals. Assuming that efficient prices follow a random walk, we measure 
informational efficiency by using stock return variance ratios. Our analysis considers a large 
sample of non-financial U.S. firms over 20 years. We find that the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals is negatively associated with the price deviation from a random walk pattern. Hence, 
informational efficiency increases with managerial discretion in accruals. These results are 
consistent with the view that discretionary accruals, on average, do convey useful information to 
investors. 
Our findings have implications for the interpretation and regulation of managerial 
discretion in accrual reporting. In particular, our results indicate that reducing accrual-based 
discretion may have adverse effects on the informational efficiency of stock prices, which should 
be taken into consideration when assessing the impact of changes in regulation of financial 
reporting. The analysis is related to the major issues addressed by the FASB in recent years (e.g., 
financial instruments, employee stock options, fixed assets and goodwill impairment and 
valuation of acquired intangibles); it is also closely linked to the current debate on rules-based vs. 
principles-based accounting—the latter model (which characterizes the international financial 
reporting standards) relying to a greater extent on managerial discretion.   
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLES DEFINITION 
Variable Definition 
ABSDA 
 
Measure of the magnitude of discretionary accruals. ABSDA is the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals obtained from a Jones (1991) accruals model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and 
Kothari et al. (2005).  
ALTZ Altman’s Z-Score is computed as Z = 1.2*WC/AT + 1.4*RE/AT + 3.3*NIBE + 0.6*MVE/TL + 
SALE/AT, where WC is working capital (Compustat WCAP); RE is retained earnings (Compustat 
RE); NIBE is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat IB); MVE is the market value of 
equity (Compustat PRCC_F*CSHO); TL is total liabilities (Compustat LT); SALE is sales 
(Compustat SALE), and AT is total assets (Compustat AT). 
BM Book-to-market ratio, computed as the book value of equity (Compustat CEQ) divided by the 
market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat PRCC_F*CSHO). 
IE1,2 Measures of stock price informational efficiency, computed as |VR(n,m)-1| multiplied by -1; 
where VR(n,m) is the return variance ratio, i.e. n/m times the ratio of the m-day return variance to 
the n-day return variance. IE1 is computed using VR(1,5) and IE2 using VR(1,10). Both measures 
are calculated over the 12-month period beginning three months after the end of the previous 
fiscal year. See Section 3. 
ILLIQ Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio; computed as the average of daily absolute stock return per dollar 
trading volume both obtained from CRSP. The measure is calculated over the 12-month period 
corresponding to the fiscal year. 
IVOL Measure of idiosyncratic volatility; computed as the in-sample standard deviation of the residuals 
of the Fama-French three-factor model. The measure is calculated over the 12-month period 
beginning three months after the end of the previous fiscal year.  
INST Average quarterly institutional ownership in the fiscal year. Quarterly institutional ownership is 
computed as the number of shares held by institutional investors at quarter end obtained from 
Thomson Financial’s 13F-filings database divided by the number of shares outstanding.  
NAF Log of (1 + number of analysts following in I/B/E/S) at the end of the fiscal year. 
NASDAQ Dummy variable coded 1 for stocks traded on NASDAQ and 0 otherwise.  
NTDAYS Number of non-trading days, computed as the number of days with zero returns in CRSP. The 
measure is calculated over the 12-month period beginning three months after the end of the 
previous fiscal year.  
SIZE Log of market value of equity (Compustat PRCC_F*CSHO) at the end of the fiscal year. 
σ(CFO) Rolling standard deviation of cash flow from operations, calculated from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal 
year t. Cash flow from operations is computed as net income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat IB) minus total accruals. Total accruals is obtained as: change in current assets 
(Compustat ACT) minus change in cash and short-term investments (Compustat CHE) minus 
change in current liabilities (Compustat LCT) plus change in debt included in current liabilities 
(Compustat DLC) minus depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat DP). 
σ(SALES) Rolling standard deviation of sales (Compustat SALE), calculated from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year 
t. 
TURN Log of share turnover; where share turnover is computed as the number of shares traded during 
the fiscal year divided by the number of shares outstanding (Compustat CSHTR_F/CSHO). 
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APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION OF A TRANSACTION-BASED INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
MEASURE (PRICING ERROR, FOLLOWING HASBROUCK 1993) 
The measure of informational efficiency relies on a model where the log of transaction 
price, pt, is decomposed in mt+st. mt is the efficient price corresponding to the expected value of 
the future payoffs—given all available information—and it is a random walk, with mt=mt1+wt; st 
is the deviation of the price from the fundamental value, denoted as pricing error.48 The measure 
of informational efficiency is based on the inverse of the magnitude of the pricing error. We focus 
on the ratio of the standard deviation of the pricing error to the standard deviation of the log of 
price (Boehmer and Wu 2013), which can be interpreted as the proportion of deviations from the 
efficient price in the total variability of the observable transaction price process. 
To obtain an estimate of the standard deviation of the pricing error, more assumptions on 
the evolution of prices and trades are required. Specifically, the variation in price and a set of 
trade characteristics are assumed to follow a VAR with five lags as follows: 
{
rt = a1rt−1 + a2rt−2 + ⋯ + b1xt−1 + b2xt−2 + ⋯ + v1,t
xt = c1rt−1 + c2rt−2 + ⋯ + d1xt−1 + d2xt−2 + ⋯ + v2,t
 
where rt is the difference in (log) prices pt and xt is a column vector of trade-related variables: the 
sign of the trade (+1 if buyer initiated; -1 if seller initiated), signed trading volume (in number of 
shares), and the signed square root of trading volume to model concavity between prices and 
trades. To infer trade direction we use the tick test (Finucane, 2000). The price of a trade is 
                                                     
48 We apply the filters to TAQ data suggested by prior literature using this measure (e.g., Boehmer and Kelley 2009; Boehmer and Wu 
2013). We exclude overnight returns. Furthermore, we require that TAQ’s CORR field is equal to zero, and the COND field is either 
blank or equal to *, B, E, J, or K. Trades with non-positive prices or sizes are eliminated. A trade with a price greater than 150% or less 
than 50% of the price of the previous trade is also excluded. Following Boehmer and Kelley (2009), we require that the stock has at 
least 200 transactions in the month used as estimation period. 
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compared to the price of the previous trade with a different price; if the price is higher (lower) 
than the previous trade with a different price, the trade is classified as buyer (seller) initiated.  
The VMA representation of the above VAR is obtained as: 
{
rt = 𝑎0
∗v1,t + 𝑎1
∗v1,t−1 + 𝑎2
∗v1,t−2 … + 𝑏0
∗v2,t + 𝑏1
∗v2,t−1 + 𝑏2
∗v2,t−2 + ⋯
xt = 𝑐0
∗v1,t + 𝑐1
∗v1,t−1 + 𝑐2
∗v1,t−2 … + 𝑑0
∗v2,t + 𝑑1
∗v2,t−1 + 𝑑2
∗v2,t−2 + ⋯
  
The variance of the efficient price is exactly identified in the model whereas the variance 
of the pricing error is not. Following prior literature, to identify the variance of the pricing error 
we use the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) restriction. The pricing error can be written as: 
st = α0v1,t + α1v1,t−1 + ⋯ + β0v2,t + β1v2,t−1 + ⋯ 
The variance the pricing error can be derived as: 
𝜎𝑠
2 = ∑ [𝛼𝑗   𝛽𝑗
∞
𝑗=0
]𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣)[𝛼𝑗  𝛽𝑗]′ 
where 𝛼𝑗 = − ∑ 𝑎𝑘
∗∞
𝑘=𝑗+1 ;  𝛽𝑗 = − ∑ 𝑏𝑘
∗∞
𝑘=𝑗+1 . 
We define the measure of informational efficiency, denoted as IE3, as negative one 
multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviation of the pricing error to the standard deviation of 
the log of price; therefore, a higher level of IE3 implies higher informational efficiency.  
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Table 1: Sample composition 
Panel A: Sample selection procedures 
  Firm-years 
All non-financial firm fiscal years 1988-2007 in CRSP/Compustat Merged 105,974 
- insufficient stock return data to compute variance ratios -12,894 
- missing or insufficient data to compute abnormal accruals -13,744 
- insufficient data to compute control variables -2,452 
Final sample 76,873 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
Industry Firm-years Pct.%  Industry Firm-years Pct.% 
Agriculture 119 0.15 Automobiles and Trucks 1,216 1.58 
Food Products 1,468 1.91 Aircraft 394 0.51 
Beer & Liquor 183 0.24 Precious Metals 747 0.97 
Recreation 780 1.01 Non-Metallic/Ind. Metal Mining 491 0.64 
Entertainment 1,179 1.53 Petroleum and Natural Gas 3,820 4.97 
Printing and Publishing 765 1.00 Utilities 3,110 4.05 
Consumer Goods 1,526 1.99 Communication 2,893 3.76 
Apparel 1,260 1.64 Personal Services 860 1.12 
Healthcare 1,540 2.00 Business Services 9,189 11.95 
Medical Equipment 3,014 3.92 Computers 3,752 4.88 
Pharmaceutical Products 4,959 6.45 Electronic Equipment 5,506 7.16 
Chemicals 1,738 2.26 Measuring and Control Eq. 2,082 2.71 
Rubber and Plastic Products 853 1.11 Business Supplies 1,261 1.64 
Textiles 444 0.58 Shipping Containers 34 0.04 
Construction Materials 1,670 2.17 Transportation 2,238 2.91 
Construction 590 0.77 Wholesale 3,290 4.28 
Steel Works Etc 1,342 1.75 Retail 4,466 5.81 
Fabricated Products 297 0.39 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 1,603 2.09 
Machinery 3,059 3.98 Other 1,666 2.17 
Electrical Equipment 1,469 1.91    
 
Panel C: Fiscal year distribution 
Year Firm-years Pct.% Year Firm-years Pct.% 
1988 3,404 4.43 1998 4,513 5.87 
1989 3,406 4.43 1999 4,236 5.51 
1990 3,426 4.46 2000 4,104 5.34 
1991 3,439 4.47 2001 4,098 5.33 
1992 3,623 4.71 2002 3,784 4.92 
1993 3,926 5.11 2003 3,747 4.87 
1994 4,193 5.45 2004 3,544 4.61 
1995 4,429 5.76 2005 3,479 4.53 
1996 4,505 5.86 2006 3,268 4.25 
1997 4,612 6.00 2007 3,137 4.08 
57 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 SD N 
IE1 -0.236 -0.187 -0.344 -0.087 0.188 76,873 
IE2 -0.302 -0.260 -0.439 -0.126 0.217 76,873 
ABSDA 0.066 0.042 0.018 0.086 0.073 76,873 
SIZE 5.240 5.090 3.626 6.721 2.206 76,873 
ILLIQx100,000 0.843 0.010 0.001 0.155 9.017 76,873 
TURN 13.452 13.556 12.788 14.267 1.230 76,873 
NASDAQ 0.576 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.494 76,873 
INST 0.373 0.334 0.117 0.601 0.280 76,873 
NAF 1.005 0.693 0.000 1.946 1.082 53,211 
BM 0.600 0.515 0.295 0.817 4.120 53,211 
σ(CFO) 0.126 0.071 0.040 0.127 0.591 53,211 
σ(SALES) 0.330 0.189 0.099 0.349 3.565 53,211 
NTDAYS 37.066 26.000 7.000 58.000 37.892 53,211 
ALTZ 4.774 3.105 1.723 5.099 14.884 53,211 
Notes: The sample for our main analysis consists of 76,873 firm-year observations from 1988-2007. Descriptive 
statistics for variables used in additional analyses are based on smaller sample sizes due to limited data availability 
for some of the variables. The variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 IE1 IE2 ABSDA SIZE ILLIQ TURN NASDAQ INST NAF BM σ(CFO) σ(SALES) NTDAYS ALTZ 
IE1 1 0.910* -0.042* 0.439* -0.148* 0.263* -0.247* 0.353* 0.311* -0.030* -0.002 -0.007 -0.427* 0.030* 
IE2 0.855* 1 -0.037* 0.402* -0.137* 0.243* -0.228* 0.327* 0.287* -0.030* -0.003 -0.007 -0.394* 0.024* 
ABSDA -0.055* -0.051* 1 -0.220* 0.023* 0.089* 0.167* -0.206* -0.114* -0.011 0.095* 0.038* 0.125* 0.003 
SIZE 0.423* 0.396* -0.242* 1 -0.141* 0.150* -0.412* 0.669* 0.566* -0.044* -0.062* -0.028* -0.613* 0.042* 
ILLIQ -0.509* -0.476* 0.200* -0.887* 1 -0.100* 0.046* -0.098* -0.090* 0.015* 0.006 0.003 0.184* -0.023* 
TURN 0.266* 0.247* 0.080* 0.250* -0.455* 1 0.189* 0.322* 0.371* -0.032* 0.034* 0.011 -0.408* 0.067* 
NASDAQ -0.217* -0.213* 0.179* -0.409* 0.350* 0.208* 1 -0.268* -0.179* 0.013* 0.057* 0.016* 0.107* 0.075* 
INST 0.332* 0.312* -0.200* 0.710* -0.711* 0.371* -0.276* 1 0.576* -0.022* -0.073* -0.027* -0.533* -0.005 
NAF 0.282* 0.265* -0.080* 0.550* -0.575* 0.405* -0.154* 0.580* 1 -0.026* -0.045* -0.017* -0.363* 0.037* 
BM -0.205* -0.183* -0.054* -0.372* 0.378* -0.297* -0.004 -0.159* -0.248* 1 -0.122* -0.002 0.038* 0.020* 
σ(CFO) -0.061* -0.057* 0.378* -0.383* 0.301* 0.191* 0.328* -0.294* -0.117* -0.124* 1 0.626* 0.014* 0.001 
σ(SALES) -0.040* -0.037* 0.273* -0.284* 0.216* 0.146* 0.210* -0.172* -0.030* -0.039* 0.496* 1 0.011 0.000 
NTDAYS -0.403* -0.378* 0.134* -0.656* 0.712* -0.475* 0.097* -0.596* -0.381* 0.322* 0.129* 0.096* 1 -0.044* 
ALTZ 0.060* 0.051* 0.039* 0.133* -0.149* 0.163* 0.142* 0.148* 0.267* -0.234* 0.017* 0.118* -0.156* 1 
Notes: The sample for our main analysis consists of 76,873 firm-year observations from 1988-2007. Correlation results for NAF, BM, σ(CFO), σ(SALES), NTDAYS 
and ALTZ are based on a smaller sample size of 53,211 firm-year observations due to limited data availability. The Pearson correlation coefficients are reported 
in the upper triangle; the Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in the lower triangle. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Discretionary accruals and informational efficiency – double sorting by firm size and discretionary accruals 
           
Number of firms in each SIZE/ABSDA portfolio: Average ABSDA in each SIZE/ABSDA portfolio: 
           
 ABSDA (low to high)    ABSDA (low to high)  
SIZE (small to 
large) 
1 2 3   SIZE (small to large) 1 2 3  
1 6,303 7,865 11,457 25,625  1 0.012 0.045 0.151  
2 8,048 8,666 8,910 25,624  2 0.012 0.044 0.143  
3 11,274 9,093 5,257 25,624  3 0.012 0.042 0.127  
Total 25,625 25,624 25,624 76,873       
           
Average IE1 in each SIZE/ABSDA portfolio: Average IE2 in each SIZE/ABSDA portfolio: 
           
 ABSDA (low to high)    ABSDA (low to high)  
SIZE (small to 
large) 
1 2 3   SIZE (small to large) 1 2 3  
1 -0.360 -0.357 -0.343   1 -0.436 -0.433 -0.417  
2 -0.214 -0.208 -0.197   2 -0.278 -0.271 -0.260  
3 -0.152 -0.151 -0.142   3 -0.214 -0.212 -0.200  
           
Notes: Firms are sorted by size (SIZE) and by the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABSDA). For each portfolio 
the table reports the number of firms, the average level of ABSDA, and of the informational efficiency measures 
(IE). All the variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5: Discretionary accruals and informational efficiency – multiple regression analysis 
Model 1:   IEt = β0 + β1ABSDAt−1 + β2SIZEt−1 + β3ILLIQt−1 + β4TURNt−1 + β5NASDAQt + β6INSTt−1 + εt 
Model 2:   IEt = β0 + β1ABSDAt−1 + β2SIZEt−1 + β3ILLIQt−1 + β4TURNt−1 + β5NASDAQt + β6INSTt−1 + β7NAFt−1 +
β8BMt−1 + β9σ(CFO)t−1 + β10σ(SALES)t−1 + β11NTDAYSt + β12ALTZt−1 + εt 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 IE1:|VR(1,5)-1|*(-1) IE2:|VR(1,10)-1|*(-1) IE1:|VR(1,5)-1|*(-1) IE2:|VR(1,10)-1|*(-1) 
ABSDA 0.098*** 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.106*** 
 [10.40] [9.81] [7.96] [7.21] 
SIZE 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 [37.70] [34.24] [17.12] [14.39] 
ILLIQ -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 [-3.23] [-3.20] [-4.35] [-4.23] 
TURN 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 [29.55] [29.63] [19.88] [19.67] 
NASDAQ -0.068*** -0.073*** -0.081*** -0.086*** 
 [-27.70] [-26.69] [-27.61] [-26.73] 
INST 0.008** 0.014*** 0.013** 0.022*** 
 [2.00] [2.93] [2.54] [3.53] 
NAF - - 0.003** 0.003** 
 - - [2.19] [2.03] 
BM - - -0.000 -0.000** 
 - - [-0.97] [-2.38] 
σ(CFO) - - 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 - - [3.09] [2.89] 
σ(SALES) - - -0.001** -0.001** 
 - - [-2.26] [-2.23] 
NTDAYS - - -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 - - [-13.36] [-14.56] 
ALTZ - - 0.000*** 0.000** 
 - - [3.07] [2.25] 
Observations 76,873 76,873 53,211 53,211 
Adjusted R² 0.287 0.243 0.313 0.266 
Notes: All the variables are defined in the Appendix. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all models. 
Reported t-values are calculated using clustered standard errors, clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Cross-sectional variation in the association between managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency 
  IEt = β0 + β1ABSDAt−1 + β2CHAR + β3ABSDAt−1 ∗ CHAR + CONTROLS + CONTROLS ∗ CHAR + εt 
 CHAR: SIZEt-1 CHAR: INST t-1 CHAR: NAF t-1 CHAR: REST t-1 
 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 
ABSDA 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.078*** 0.090*** 
 [6.26] [5.41] [9.30] [8.28] [8.91] [8.05] [5.63] [5.19] 
CHAR 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.497*** 0.556*** 0.119*** 0.127*** -0.051 -0.077 
 [18.73] [17.48] [13.27] [13.15] [9.98] [9.50] [-1.00] [-1.23] 
ABSDA*CHAR -0.018*** -0.014** -0.115*** -0.083** -0.018** -0.010 -0.219*** -0.185** 
 [-3.50] [-2.45] [-3.58] [-2.17] [-2.10] [-0.99] [-3.60] [-2.27] 
         
 + MAIN CONTROLS + MAIN CONTROLS * CHAR 
         
Observations 76,873 76,873 76,873 76,873 76,873 76,873 29,161 29,161 
Adjusted R² 0.320 0.271 0.310 0.264 0.304 0.259 0.195 0.151 
Notes: Characteristics (CHAR) potentially affecting the cross-sectional variation in the association between managerial discretion in accruals and informational 
efficiency are interacted with the control variables and with ABSDA. REST is a dummy variable which takes value one for firm year observations corresponding 
to accrual-related restatements (see Section 6). All the other variables are defined in the Appendix. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all models. 
Reported t-values are calculated using clustered standard errors, clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7: Validity of the informational efficiency measure - Results for portfolios with low transaction/information costs 
  IEt = β0 + β1ABSDAt−1 + β2SIZEt−1 + β3ILLIQt−1 + β4TURNt−1 + β5NASDAQt + β6INSTt−1 + εt 
 Large-Cap Low Illiquidity 
Low Number of  
Non-Trading Days 
High Turnover 
High Institutional 
Ownership 
More than Two 
Analysts 
Following 
Traded Options 
 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 IE1 IE2 
ABSDA 0.078*** 0.101*** 0.057*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.078*** 0.060*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.102*** 0.074*** 0.097*** 0.058*** 0.089*** 
 [6.29] [6.53] [5.44] [5.47] [6.08] [5.77] [5.86] [6.04] [5.86] [6.33] [5.78] [6.13] [4.32] [5.02] 
SIZE 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 [19.83] [14.32] [8.45] [3.17] [15.99] [9.64] [24.51] [21.24] [24.15] [19.55] [19.07] [13.24] [9.72] [5.31] 
ILLIQ -0.011* -0.013** -1.654*** -2.069*** -0.125*** -0.133*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.029** -0.035** 
 [-1.78] [-2.08] [-12.98] [-12.89] [-9.80] [-9.73] [-3.25] [-3.20] [-3.40] [-3.40] [-1.13] [-1.18] [-2.20] [-2.11] 
TURN 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 
 [17.54] [17.41] [11.63] [10.52] [14.99] [14.43] [23.06] [20.44] [18.84] [19.02] [17.63] [16.35] [11.47] [10.78] 
NASDAQ -0.033*** -0.042*** -0.009*** -0.018*** -0.024*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.047*** -0.055*** -0.033*** -0.044*** -0.005** -0.012*** 
 [-11.38] [-12.57] [-3.77] [-5.95] [-9.73] [-12.13] [-13.17] [-13.34] [-16.16] [-16.91] [-11.93] [-13.40] [-2.35] [-4.10] 
INST 0.009** 0.008 -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.007 0.006 -0.009** -0.019*** 
 [1.99] [1.47] [-3.88] [-3.38] [-3.36] [-2.63] [3.63] [4.32] [6.07] [6.03] [1.38] [0.90] [-2.19] [-3.30] 
Observations 38,432 38,432 38,437 38,437 37,292 37,292 38,435 38,435 38,434 38,434 29,358 29,358 18,893 18,893 
Adjusted R² 0.112 0.078 0.062 0.041 0.130 0.089 0.246 0.201 0.193 0.144 0.118 0.082 0.044 0.029 
Notes: This table reports the results using sub-samples with low transaction and information costs. We examine firm-year observations with: (1) more than median 
market capitalization (‘Large cap’); (2) less than median Amihud illiquidity ratio (‘Low Illiquidity’); (3) less than median non-trading days (‘Low Number of Non-
Trading Days’), (4) more than median turnover (‘High Turnover’); (5) more than median institutional ownership (‘High Institutional Ownership’); (6) more than 
two sell-side analysts following (‘More than Two Analysts Following’); (7) options trading available in the calendar year corresponding to the fiscal year-end 
(‘Traded Options’). All the other variables are defined in the Appendix. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all models. Reported t-values are calculated 
using clustered standard errors, clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Validity of the informational efficiency measure - Variance ratios at different time horizons and results using Hasbrouck’s (1993) pricing error 
  IEt = β0 + β1ABSDAt−1 + β2SIZEt−1 + β3ILLIQt−1 + β4TURNt−1 + β5NASDAQt + β6INSTt−1 + εt 
 Panel A: Variance ratios at different time horizons Panel B: Hasbrouck’s (1993) pricing error 
 |VR(2,5)-1|*(-1) |VR(2,10)-1|*(-1) |VR(5,10)-1|*(-1) |VR(1,20)-1|*(-1) |VR(1,30)-1|*(-1) IE3 IE1 IE2 
ABSDA 0.058*** 0.073*** 0.029*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.030*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 
 [9.30] [8.45] [5.83] [8.95] [8.65] [2.88] [4.48] [3.55] 
SIZE 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 [30.92] [26.85] [17.42] [30.43] [27.29] [26.77] [13.52] [10.88] 
ILLIQ -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.029*** -0.033*** 
 [-3.34] [-3.34] [-3.48] [-3.25] [-3.21] [-6.48] [-4.60] [-4.61] 
TURN 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 
 [25.94] [25.51] [19.07] [28.39] [26.87] [13.15] [11.67] [10.68] 
NASDAQ -0.040*** -0.049*** -0.018*** -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.033*** 
 [-25.04] [-23.40] [-16.58] [-26.15] [-24.68] [-12.69] [-5.71] [-6.69] 
INST 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.005 -0.003 
 [3.60] [4.19] [4.27] [4.78] [5.67] [7.15] [0.68] [-0.38] 
Observations 76,873 76,873 76,873 76,838 76,815 12,050 12,050 12,050 
Adjusted R² 0.226 0.180 0.082 0.193 0.158 0.337 0.123 0.090 
Notes: Panel A presents the results using informational efficiency measures calculated based on variance ratios at different time horizons. Panel B reports the 
results using an alternative measure of informational efficiency, Hasbrouck’s (1993) pricing error, denoted as IE3 (see Section 7). All the other variables are defined 
in the Appendix. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all models. Reported t-values are calculated using clustered standard errors, clustered by firm. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Validity of the managerial discretion measure – Results excluding unusual business circumstances 
Model 1:   IEt = β0 + β1ABSDAt−1 + β2SIZEt−1 + β3ILLIQt−1 + β4TURNt−1 + β5NASDAQt + β6INSTt−1 + εt 
Model 2:   IEt = β0 + β1ABSDAt−1 + β2SIZEt−1 + β3ILLIQt−1 + β4TURNt−1 + β5NASDAQt + β6INSTt−1 + β7NAFt−1 +
β8BMt−1 + β9σ(CFO)t−1 + β10σ(SALES)t−1 + β11NTDAYSt + β12ALTZt−1 + εt 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 IE1:|VR(1,5)-1|*(-1) IE2:|VR(1,10)-1|*(-1) IE1:|VR(1,5)-1|*(-1) IE2:|VR(1,10)-1|*(-1) 
ABSDA 0.114*** 0.124*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 
 [10.23] [9.54] [7.10] [6.06] 
SIZE 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 [35.53] [31.86] [15.95] [13.29] 
ILLIQ -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 [-4.71] [-4.68] [-3.48] [-3.44] 
TURN 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 
 [27.08] [26.93] [18.05] [17.72] 
NASDAQ -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.085*** -0.090*** 
 [-27.30] [-26.26] [-26.94] [-25.94] 
INST 0.011** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 
 [2.42] [3.26] [3.12] [3.91] 
NAF - - 0.002 0.002 
 - - [1.48] [1.31] 
BM - - -0.001 -0.000 
 - - [-0.69] [-0.43] 
σ(CFO) - - 0.004*** 0.005** 
 - - [2.59] [2.51] 
σ(SALES) - - 0.002* 0.002* 
 - - [1.69] [1.82] 
NTDAYS - - -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 - - [-13.06] [-14.00] 
ALTZ - - 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 - - [4.50] [3.63] 
Observations 62,863 62,863 44,298 44,298 
Adjusted R² 0.294 0.248 0.317 0.267 
Notes: This table reports the results excluding firm-year observations that are potentially affected by unusual 
business circumstances. Unusual business circumstances are identified as firm-year observations that have (1) major 
acquisitions (Compustat SALE footnote is "AB"), (2) large discontinued operations (absolute value of discontinued 
operations (Compustat DO) divided by sales (Compustat SALE) > 5%), (3) four-digit SIC industry changes, (4) large 
restructuring charges (absolute value of restructuring charges (Compustat RCP) divided by sales > 5%), and (5) large 
special items (absolute value of special items (Compustat SPI) divided by sales (Compustat SALE) > 5%). All the other 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all models. Reported t-values 
are calculated using clustered standard errors, clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
